the incumbent government. This is very similar to what most movements have done in the Middle East and closely resembles the now famous occupation of Tahirir Square in Egypt. Another similarity is the apparent emphasis on non-violence, at least at this stage of the political struggle. The PDRC’s name includes the words "people" and "democracy", also very similar to other liberation movements. Therefore, on the surface the so-called yellow shirts of the PDRC look very similar to other liberation movements. Nevertheless, form is not essence and the similarity ends here.

To understand the present political struggle in Thailand it is necessary to look at recent Thai history as well as to understand important demographic and economic trends in the country. From an economic and demographic standpoint two trends are important. The first characteristic of the Thai economy that stands out to the experienced social scientist is that development in Thailand is heavily asymmetrical (Wyatt, 2003). Bangkok has benefitted disproportionately from government investments in infrastructure and from foreign direct investment. Wages and household income are much higher in Central Thailand than in the rest of the country. Another important observation is that the inhabitants of the upper South and central Bangkok share a similar culture which is very different from that of the Deep South and from that of the North and Northeast (Mulder, 1996, 2000). Superficial research shows that a few centuries ago those regions were completely separate Kingdoms (Heidhues, 2000). Therefore, two conclusions have been reached, first that economic growth and development has not reached the entire country, and second that there are important socio-cultural differences between different regions of the country.

In terms of recent Thai history connected to the present struggle two important events come to mind, the democratic constitution of 1997 and the election of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister. Both events are directly connected to the present struggle and complement the demographic socio-economic trends discussed in the previous paragraph. Thailand was ruled by several military rulers during the Cold War and its constitution was changed almost as often as its military rulers (Wyatt, 2003). The end of the Cold War and the economic boom of the 1990s combined with the enlightened ideas of a few members of the intelligentsia resulted in the passing of the most democratic constitution in the country’s history. With a strong protection of human rights, elected upper and lower houses of parliament, and nominal civilian control over the armed forces it marked a high point in the country’s democratic development. While the constitution was not as democratic as the one of the Philippines and suffered from the interference of several strong unelected agencies and institutions, it provided for a high degree of democratic governance and for respect for the rule of law.

The constitution of 1997 resulted in a shift of power from unelected bureaucrats to the common voter and thus political parties became more important than ever in mobilizing the vote. Thailand’s oldest political party, the Democrat Party, has a very conservative ideology mixing corporatism, extreme nationalism, and royalism. In terms of its core, the Democrat Party enjoys the support of the Upper South and Central Thailand, in particular the middle and traditional upper classes. In the early 21st century Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra managed to bring together a wide range of opposition parties to form the Thai Rak Thai political party. This new party favored globalization, development of the provinces, and greater opportunities for the poor. Predictably, TRT’s platform received considerable support from the provinces and from the working classes while it also created considerable opposition from conservatives.

Thai Rak Thai won several elections with some of the highest margins in Thai history, resulting is clear shift of power from the traditional bureaucracy and unelected elite to a new breed of elected officials supported by the broad electorate. This shift of power threatened traditional centers of power such as the Military, the bureaucracy, and conservative royalists. Traditional business sectors were also threatened due to the new emphasis on globalization and foreign direct investment. The result of the growing opposition was a Military Coup against the elected government in 2006 (Ungpakorn, 2007). The constitution was changed and a new one was drafted by an unelected committee under the supervision of the Military and other conservative elements. Predictably the elections under the new constitution brought back Shinawatra’s supporters under a new name. Maneuvering by the powerful unelected agencies, strengthened by the 2006 Constitution, resulted in the removal of two Shinawatra-aligned Prime Ministers, and to the rise to power of the unelected head of the Democrat Party as Prime Minister. At the end of his unelected term the government was forced by the constitution to call for elections with predictable results, the election of Shinawatra’s very own sister, Yingluck as the Prime Minister.

The popular election of Shinawatra’s sister, someone who had not been in politics before, made it very difficult for the opposition to make any sudden unconstitutional moves to remove her from power. Nevertheless the opposition of a vast array of conservative and reactionary elements continued to simmer under the apparent peace. An attempt by parliament to pass a law providing amnesty to both sides of the political divide for the violence that took place in the preceding years was met with strong opposition from the Bangkok elite and by a coalition of so-called Yellow Shirts opposed to the government and to its grassroots supporters. The Democrat’s party failure to mount an effective opposition against the measure inside of parliament resulted in the boycotting of the institution by Democrat members of parliament and in the subsequent mobilization of the Yellow Shirts under the new banner of the PDRC.

It should be noted that the PDRC has attempted to occupy government buildings, parks, and even threatened to occupy the airport. Violence has been limited due to the army’s neutrality; however several violent elements have been identified supporting the PDRC camp. An election that took place in February 2014 was boycotted by the opposition but resulted in a clear win for the governing party.

Understanding the PDRC and its supporters:

It is important to understand the interests of the PDRC and its supporters. While the PDRC is a relatively diverse coalition they share some important interests. Many of the movement’s leaders are disgruntled Democrat politicians who have found it increasingly difficult to have an impact on national policy due to the dwindling support for their party and the resulting weakness in the legislature. Others have deeper grievances touching important social norms and values. A small section of the movement is focused on national pride and tradition and fears that Shinawatra’s allies are moving the country away from traditional Thai values. The values they hold are respect for a highly hierarchical society, unquestioning respect for the monarchy, strong support for Theravada Buddhism, territorial nationalism, and a strong commitment to centralization of political and economic power in the capital.

Interest groups are compatible with democracy and people have a right to support the religion of their choice. Nevertheless, there are some values held by the PDRC that are inherently incompatible with democracy in the strict sense of the word. One very obvious contradiction is the role of the military vis a vis the civilian government. An important tenet of democracy is civilian control of the military. A majority of PDRC supporters consider the military to be an independent institution only accountable to the King. In turn, the PDRC supports a strong military role in influencing internal political affairs. Another way to understand this is that the PDRC views a possible military coup in order to remove the present government as not only good but necessary. Therefore the PDRC is clearly an undemocratic movement based on this value favoring political reform through unconstitutional violent means.

In terms of values regarding the proper role of the people, the PDRC is equally undemocratic. A highly hierarchical view permeates the ethos of the movement. The popular grassroots supporters of the ruling government are deemed to be unworthy of holding political power. Metaphors comparing and equating government supporters to children or even to untrained animals aim to disqualify a large majority of the population from effective citizenship. Thus, election results are considered to be invalid not because of the actual mechanism behind the vote count but rather by questioning the actual value of a person’s vote in comparison to someone else’s. Not only this is blatant discrimination but it shows a deep aversion to one of the integral values of a democracy, people’s power.

The hierarchical view of society is also evident in the economic policies espoused by the movement. A well known pseudo-theory proposed by King Rama IX but clearly influenced by other conservative thinkers, called the self-sufficiency economy, basically encourages people to be satisfied with what they have and to consume according to their station in life. This revival of medieval economics basically sends the message to the poor in the provinces that they should be happy etching a living from the land while the capital benefits from a free market economy and foreign direct investment. The problem with this view of development is not only that it ignores the future aspirations of millions but most importantly that it is detrimental to the economy as a whole. With a rising cost of labor in Thailand and a prolonged economic recession in the developed West, it is basic economic theory that it is important to develop a strong internal consumer market. How can this market be developed if a wide majority of the population is told to be happy with earning just enough to survive and to stop seeking to change their economic situation?

What can the international community do about this?

The PDRC and its supporters are nationalists yet they care deeply about the international image of their country. One interesting example is how the military decided to decorate its watchtowers in the city with flowers in order to reassure foreign tourists of the peaceful nature of the political stalemate. In addition to that, the language used by the PDRC clearly follows an international template intended to please foreign audiences used to the protection of human rights and universal democratic values. Therefore one of the most effective roles for the foreign observer is to shame the PDRC and to explain the true nature of the conflict to fellow foreigners. Another important action that can be taken is to communicate to the PDRC and its supporters that the international community defends the basic tenets of democracy.

Tourism and foreign direct investment play a very important role in Thailand and thus any fluctuation that could be explained as resulting from foreign opposition to an unconstitutional transfer of power will strengthen the democratically elected government and pressure the PDRC to give up some of its most extreme demands. Shaming can be a powerful weapon against undemocratic movements and even if the PDRC fails to change its position it will result in a negative defensive reaction which will further tarnish its image.

Conclusion:

The PDRC is not a democratic liberation movement by any stretch of the imagination but rather a coalition of reactionary elements attempting to stop socio-economic progress so as to protect their interests. Foreign observers must see the movement as a conservative backlash to globalization, democratization, and decentralization. Another unconstitutional transfer of power in Thailand against the will of the majority of the population would not only be morally wrong but would accost the development of the country.

References:

Heidhues, M. S. (2000). Southeast Asia: A Concise History. London: Thames & Hudson.

Mulder, N. (1996). Inside Southeast Asia: Religion, Everyday Life, and Cultural Change. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

Mulder, N. (2000). Inside Thai Society (1st ed.). Bangkok: Silkworm Books.

Ungpakorn, G. J. (2007). A Coup for the Rich: Thailand's Political Crisis. Bangkok: Workers Democracy Publishing.

Wyatt, D. K. (2003). Thailand: A Short History (Thailand ed.). Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.